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 Abstract. 
 
The study of corporate governance and the most appropriate way to regulate 
it, first became a mainstream topic post the failure of Enron in 2002. Since 
then much discussion has taken place on the best way to regulate the 
governance of companies and to ensure that companies are governed in a 
manner that reflects the interests of its shareholders. America with the 
introduction of  Sarbanes-Oxley took a legislative backed approach, whilst the 
UK and Ireland adopted a “comply or explain” approach. This “comply or 
explain” approach gives companies a choice of whether to apply the 
Combined Codes guidelines on corporate governance within their company or 
not. One area given prominence in the Combined Code is the appointment of 
independent non-executive directors to the board and committees within the 
company, their main role being to ensure that the directors run the company 
in the appropriate manner. This research looks at whether Irish listed 
companies are complying with the various sections of the combined code 
regarding the appointment of independent non-executive directors to the 
board and committees. 
 
This study has revealed that Irish listed companies are in most cases fully 
compliant with the Combined Code provisions and believe that proper 
corporate governance policies are important to their business. However the 
study has also revealed that many companies are compliant with the 
provisions of the combined code but not with its spirit. Although respondent 
companies have stated that they have appointed the appropriate number of 
independent non-executive directors, the criteria used for such appointments 
has being manipulate to such an extent that their appointment has become 
ineffective in achieving its desired goals. 
 
The study has revealed that the “comply or explain” approach is flawed and 
has allowed manipulation of the combined codes guidelines  which has had a 
direct influence on some of Irelands recent corporate scandals e.g. Anglo Irish 
Bank. 
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Chapter 1. 
1.Introduction. 
 
1.1. Prologue. 
 
Companies around the world have suffered during the economic recession of 
the past few years. Some of the worlds largest companies e.g. Lehman 
brothers, collapsed along with the entire banking system of Iceland. 
 
What was the cause of this sudden downturn in the world economy after an 
extended period of economic growth? There is no simple answer to this 
question. The fact is that it was a combination of a number of factors including 
the collapse of the American sub prime market, loose regulation of the 
banking system and the improper governance of companies. 
 
Whatever the reason, the current economic situation has refocused attention 
on the governance of companies. Question marks have being raised over the 
effectiveness of the Combined Code and its ability to regulate those who 
control the decision making by companies. 
 
Grant Thornton’s yearly investigation into Irish corporate governance 
practices have exposed a culture of box ticking amongst Irelands’ listed 
companies, “what we are lacking is compliance with regulations, and, even 
more importantly, enforcement of compliance and strong sanctions for non-
compliance.” Grant Thornton 2010. Many corporate governance experts 
believe it is time to implement new corporate governance regulation in Ireland 
backed by legislation with penalties for non compliance. Legislative backing 
should ensure that companies view compliance with the combined code as 
more than just a box ticking exercise. 
 
The recent failures have led the researcher to ask the following questions: 
• Has the current system of corporate governance regulation failed? 
• Where have the mistakes being made in the current regulation? 
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• Is it time for a new legislative backed system of corporate governance 
regulation as opposed to the current “comply or explain” approach? 
 
1.2. Research Questions and Objectives. 
 
My research question is:  
• To what extent do companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
comply with the independence requirements of combined code? 
 
My research objectives are: 
 
• To determine if companies listed on the Irish Stock exchange are 
complying with the following requirements of the combined code 2008: 
 
o A.3.2: Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive 
directors determined by the board to be independent. A smaller 
company should have at least two independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
o A.3.3: The board should appoint one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent director. 
 
o A.4.1: There should be a nomination committee which should 
lead the process for board appointments and make 
recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the 
nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
o B.2.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee of 
at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors. Where remuneration 
consultants are appointed, a statement should be made 
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available of whether they have any other connection with the 
company.”  
 
• The number of years service a company believes it can receive from 
an independent non executive director and still regard them as 
independent. 
• The number of external boards a company believes an independent 
non executive director may participate in and still perform their roles 
and responsibilities effectively. 
 
1.3 Justification for the Research. 
 
Over fifty percent of the largest economies in the world are companies. Thus 
the proper governance of these companies is as important to the global 
economy as the proper governance of entire countries. The importance of 
having formal corporate governance principles and practices in place  first 
became clear in 2002 after a series of corporate meltdowns, frauds and other 
failings led to the destruction of billions of dollars of shareholder wealth, the 
loss of thousands of jobs, the criminal investigations of dozens of executives, 
and record breaking bankruptcy filings. Corporate failures have indeed 
happened in the past but the reason these scandals became the most widely 
reported “was the sense that every one of the mechanisms set up to provide 
checks and balances failed at the same time” Monks & Minow 2004. 
Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA  in 2002 and a greater 
emphasis on compliance with the Combined Code in the UK and Ireland (both 
of which are discussed in more detail later) followed. These new regulations 
were introduced to ensure that failures on such a scale did not occur again. 
However less than a decade later the governance of companies and the 
mechanisms put in place to ensure the failures of the past were not repeated 
are the subject of much debate. 
 
The scale of the corporate failures at Enron, Parmalat, Tyco and Worldcom 
have being exceeded by corporate failures at Lehman brothers in the USA, 
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Anglo Irish Bank and the Quinn Group in Ireland and the entire financial 
sector in Iceland. If the problems occurred last time due to the absence of 
national controls over the governance of companies, what was the cause of 
the failures this time? Recent studies carried out by the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia and the ODCE have highlighted a growing trend 
amongst companies of complying with the form rather than the substance of 
regulations and best practices. This is what happened in both Enron and 
Satyam who both failed amid corporate governance irregularities. Enron had 
the proper mechanisms in place to ensure good corporate governance, while 
Satyam had award winning corporate governance practices. However both 
companies failed amid corporate governance problems due to the fact that no 
one in either company followed the guidelines (Satyam failed less than a year 
after winning a prestigious corporate governance award). 
 
Another failure highlighted by both studies was the gap between what the 
appointments of independent directors were supposed to achieve by being 
appointed to the board and what in practice they had actually achieved. The 
Securities Commission found that independent directors were not being as 
effective as planned and blamed this on the fact that “some independent 
directors may serve on multiple boards, diluting the attention and focus that 
should be reserved for each individual company. Some have become board 
fixtures – part of the corporate furniture – such that they appear too intimate 
with the company to be deemed independent.” Given the huge importance of 
the role independent directors’ play in ensuring the successful governance of 
companies this finding is cause for concern. This led the researcher to ask if 
the same problems were to blame for the failures in the governance of 
companies in Ireland over the last two-three years. 
 
 
With this in mind this research will explore the levels of compliance with the 
Combined Code 2008 amongst companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
and also highlight any shortcomings or failures with the current corporate 
governance requirements in Ireland. The research will also aim to determine 
whether the independent directors that have being appointed to the boards of 
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Irish Plc’s are indeed independent. The researcher will also highlight any 
problems uncovered with the current system of corporate governance 
regulation and give recommendations for improvement. 
 
This research will be useful to anyone interested in the governance of 
companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange including investors, regulators 
and those carrying out further research into this area as the research will: 
•  Determine the attitude of directors of Irish listed companies to proper 
corporate governance. 
• Determine the levels of compliance with the Combine Code 2008 
amongst companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. 
• Outline some of the shortcomings and failures of the current regulation 
of corporate governance. 
• Suggest possible solutions to the above mentioned shortcomings and 
failures. 
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Chapter 2. 
Literature Review. 
 
“The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world 
economies as the proper governing of countries”. Wolfensohn c1999 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
 
2.1.1 What is corporate governance? 
 
Corporation: “n.1 a group of people authorised to act as an individual and 
recognised in law as a single entity esp. in business.” Oxford English 
Dictionary 
Governance:”n.1 the act or manner of governing.2 the office or function of 
governing.3 sway, control.”  Oxford English Dictionary. 
Govern: “v.1 tr. Rule or control with authority; conduct the policy an affairs of. 
2a tr. Influence or determine (a person or a course of action).b intr. be the 
predominating influence.” Oxford English Dictionary. 
 
Thus corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, 
and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or 
controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the 
many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is 
governed. Corporate governance has therefore been in existence for as long 
as corporations themselves.  The study of the subject is less than half a 
century old and has now “become one  of the central issues in the running 
and the regulating of modern enterprises.”  Tricker. B ,2009.  
 
2.1.2 Evolution of corporate governance. 
 
Corporate governance came to prominence with the advent of the corporation 
in the late 19th century. The growth in the number of corporations and the 
growing separation between owners and managers necessitated regulation to 
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ensure the owners’ interests were protected. Berle and Means (1932) drew 
attention to this growing separation. They observed that” the rise of the 
modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power which 
can be compared on equal terms with the modern state........The state seeks 
in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the corporation, steadily 
becoming more powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation...”Berle 
and Means 1932 
 
The next major developments in corporate governance occurred in the 1970s. 
In the United States the significance of independent outside directors was 
recognised and audit committees were introduced. Debates also arose 
around board duties towards other stakeholders. Interest in the governance of 
companies due to a number of corporate governance problems features in the 
report of inspectors appointed by the UK government Department of Trade 
such as reports into Pergamon Press (1971) involving Robert Maxwell, Rolls 
Royce (1973) and Lonrho (1976). 
 
In the 1980s due to the lack of regulation on corporate governance cracks 
began to appear. These corporate governance problems were brought into 
the public domain due to the Guinness case and the failure of Robert 
Maxwell’s companies. It was seen that more control over the governance of 
companies was needed, “Boards dominated by powerful executive directors 
were seen to need checks and balances, particularly where the posts of chief 
executive director and chairman of the board were combined and the outside 
directors were weak” Tricker. B, 2009. 
 
In 1992 the Cadbury report was published. It developed proposals and codes 
of best practice aimed at enhancing the governance of companies and 
prevent their collapse. Many reports followed around the world all aimed at 
enhancing the governance of companies and offering protection to the 
interests of shareholders. As the 21st century began corporate governance 
seemed to be well developed around the world. However disaster struck 
which propelled corporate governance to the forefront of business issues. 
Seven of the 12 largest bankruptcies were filed in 2002. Companies like 
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Enron, Tyco and WorldCom will forever be linked to corporate failure. In terms 
of corporate governance issues, Ahold, Enron and WorldCom all suffered 
from:  
• “Questionable ethics,  
• Inappropriate behavior of senior figures,  
• Aggressive earnings management, 
• Weak internal control,  
• Risk management, 
• Shortcomings in accounting and reporting.” Crawford 2007. 
 
These companies were also involved in the following questionable accounting 
practices. 
 
Company  Country  What went wrong  
Ahold  NL  earnings overstated  
Enron  USA  inflated earnings, hid debt in SPEs  
Parmalat  Italy  false transactions recorded  
Tyco  USA  looting by CEO, improper share deals, evidence of tampering 
and falsifying business records  
WorldCom  USA  expenses booked as capital expenditure  
Xerox  USA  accelerated revenue recognition  
 
 
One might ask, why are these failures so important, don’t companies fail all 
the time? Corporate failures have indeed happened in the past but the reason 
these scandals became the most widely reported “was the sense that every 
one of the mechanisms set up to provide checks and balances failed at the 
same time” Monks & Minow 2004.  
 
In response to the above failures the United States introduced the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and in the UK and Ireland although already in existence the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance was deemed to be of utmost 
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importance. These measures were aimed at preventing such collapses form 
happening again. 
 
However history often repeats itself and despite the introduction of legislation 
and guidelines many large companies fell into turmoil again e.g. the banks in 
Ireland, Lehman brothers (which filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on 
September 15 2008, the largest in U.S history) in America and the complete 
collapse of the banking system in Iceland. Once again many jobs were lost, 
billions of dollars was wiped of shareholder wealth and CEO’s were being 
investigated again. Due to these failures and other factor (collapse of the sub-
prime market in the United States) the world was plunged into a worldwide 
recession, “the magnitude of the current recession could be the most severe 
in decades, perhaps comparable to the Great Depression.”Gascon. C.S 2009. 
 
2.1.3 The need for corporate governance guidelines/legislation. 
 
In the wake of the spectacular collapses of Enron, Polly Peck and Maxwell, 
there were calls for guidelines/legislation to be enacted to ensure such 
collapses would not happen again. Sir Adrian Cadbury in 1999 stated that “the 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources 
and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of the resources. The 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individual, corporations 
and society.” The United States and the UK and Ireland have different 
approaches to regulating corporate governance. The United States 
implemented the Sarbanes-Oxley Ac in 2002 and made compliance with it 
compulsory for public companies listed on an American Stock Exchange. 
However the UK and Ireland adopted a principle based approach with public 
companies being encouraged to comply rather than being required to comply. 
 
2.1.4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
 
The aim of the Act is “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and 
for other purposes.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. The legislation set new or 
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enhanced standards for all U.S. public company boards, management and 
public accounting firms. It does not apply to privately held companies. The Act 
contains 11 titles, or sections, ranging from additional corporate board 
responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement rulings on requirements to comply 
with the new law. All public companies (including foreign companies listed on 
an American Stock exchange) must comply with the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxely Act 2002. 
 
 Debate continues over the perceived benefits and costs of SOX. Supporters 
contend the legislation was necessary and has played a useful role in 
restoring public confidence in the nation's capital markets by, among other 
things, strengthening corporate accounting controls. SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox stated in 2007: "Sarbanes–Oxley helped restore trust in U.S. 
markets by increasing accountability, speeding up reporting, and making 
audits more independent."  Opponents of the bill claim it has reduced 
America's international competitive edge against foreign financial service 
providers, saying SOX has introduced an overly complex regulatory 
environment into U.S. financial markets. "The new laws and regulations have 
neither prevented frauds nor instituted fairness. But they have managed to kill 
the creation of new public companies in the U.S., cripple the venture capital 
business, and damage entrepreneurship.” Wall Street Journal 2008. 
 
2.2 The Combined Code. 
 
2.2.1 Evolution of the Combined Code. 
 
The Combined Code was developed by consolidating and refining a number 
of different reports and codes concerning opinions on best practice within 
corporate governance. The first such report issued was the Cadbury report 
1992 (report on the financial aspects of corporate governance). The Cadbury 
Report was a response to major corporate scandals associated with 
governance failures in the UK (such as Robert Maxwell’s executive abuses).  
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The Cadbury code outlined the first explicit guidelines on corporate 
governance in the UK. The first combined code was issued in 1998 
(combining the Cadbury report 1992, the Greenbury report 1995 and the 
Hemple report 1998), with UK companies being required to report on their 
compliance from year ends beginning on or after 1st November 2003.  Since 
1998 the combined code has gone through a number of revisions, usually in 
response to the recommendations made by various reports on issues covered 
by the code. Reports that have had an influence on the combined code 
include the Turnbull Report 1999, the Smith report 2003(review of audit 
committees), the Tyson report 2003 and the Higgs report 2003(review of the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors).  
 
2.2.2 Overview of the combined code. 
 
The combined code contains two sections:  
Section 1 deals with companies while Section 2 deals with Institutional share 
holders. 
This is further subdivided as follows: 
A: Directors 
B: Remuneration.  
C: Accountability and Audit.  
D: Relations with Shareholders. 
E: Institutional Shareholders. 
 
The code has been structured using a three tier approach: main principles, 
supporting principles, code provisions with companies needing to disclose 
compliance with both the main principles and supporting principles. The 
Combined Code adopts a principles-based approach in the sense that it 
provides general guidelines of best practice. This contrasts with a rules-based 
(as exists in the United States with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) approach 
which rigidly defines exact provisions that must be adhered to. A principles 
based approach was selected as the over arching goal is good corporate 
governance by whatever means, “While it is expected that companies will 
comply wholly or substantially with its provisions, it is recognised that 
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noncompliance may be justified in particular circumstances if good 
governance can be achieved by other means.” Combined code 2008. The last 
amendments to the combined code were made in 2008. A newly amended 
combined code is scheduled for issue sometime in 2010. 
 
2.2.3 Who does the combined code apply to? 
 
 Irish incorporated companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange are required 
to comply with the Combined Code. Although the Code does not form part of 
the Listing Rules of the ISE listed companies are obligated to state in their 
annual report (1) how they have applied the principles of the Code; and (2) 
whether they have complied with the Code’s provisions and if not to explain 
any non-compliance (known as ‘comply or explain’). The objective of this 
approach is to “maximize transparency, allowing investors to make informed 
investment decisions, while, at the same time, not imposing a ‘one size fits all’ 
governance regime on a diverse corporate sector.” www.ise.ie  
 
2.2.4 Levels of compliance. 
 
Compliance with the combined code is important as it shows the company’s 
commitment to achieving best standards in corporate governance. It is also 
seen by investors to be important, “In a survey of over 200 institutional 
investors it was found that 80% of respondents would pay a premium for well 
governed companies, from 11% in Canada to 40% in Egypt” Global Investor 
Opinion Survey, 2002. In the light of such information it would seem 
reasonable to assume that companies would apply with the provisions, 
however this does not seem to be the case. In Grant Thornton’s corporate 
governance review 2009 only 51% of companies claimed full compliance with 
the combined code, while in 2010 only 36% of companies claiming full 
compliance. They also believe that the principles based approach and the 
comply or explain requirement of the Irish stock exchange has “resulted in 
compliance with the letter of the guidance, but not its spirit,” Grant Thornton 
2009. Many companies in Ireland seem to be paying lip service to the 
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combined codes provisions and are only doing the minimum required to be 
seen as compliant. 
 
2.3 Independence. 
 
2.3.1 What is independence? 
 
Independence is defined as “2.a. Not depending on another person for one’s 
opinion or livelihood.3, unwilling to be under an obligation to others.” Oxford 
English Dictionary. 
 
In relation to independent directors, Sir Adrian Cadbury states that they 
should be “independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgment, apart from their fees and shareholding.” 
 
However in relation to non-executive directors no tests of independence have 
been laid down, the Hampel report stated “we do not consider it practicable to 
lay down more precise criteria for independence. We agree that it should be 
for the board to take a view on whether an individual director is independent in 
the above sense.” This has led to a situation where each company has a 
different definition of what they believe independent to be and thus trying to 
determine what independence is, is “like nailing jelly to a ceiling.” Chambers 
and Weight 2008. Furthermore companies do not publish what their tests of 
independence are. This makes it impossible to determine whether their 
approach is achieving what it is supposed to achieve i.e. independent 
directors, or is used as a tool by which the company directors can control 
appointments to the board and thus control the board.  
 
The combined code 2008 outlines the following test which must be considered 
when determining independence: 
• “has been an employee of the company or group within the last five 
years; 
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• has, or has had within the last three years, a material business 
relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, 
shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a 
relationship with the company; 
• has received or receives additional remuneration from the company 
apart from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option 
or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the 
company’s pension scheme; 
• has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or 
senior employees; 
• holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors 
through involvement in other companies or bodies; 
•  represents a significant shareholder; or 
• has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their 
first election.” 
 
However this is still a long way from actually defining independence. A close 
friend of the director could still be deemed to be independent when in reality it 
is likely that they are not. To further complicate the mater a 2004 study found 
that 91% of respondents believed that independence of mind is more 
important than independence in sprit.” Moxey P 
 
2.3.2 Role of independent non-executive directors. 
 
The importance of the role that independent non-executive directors have in 
ensuring the proper governance of the company they are involved in cannot 
be overlooked. General Electrics’ 2002 annual report states that “"At the core 
of corporate governance, of course, is the role of the board in overseeing how 
management serves the long-term interests of share owners and other 
stakeholders. An active, informed, independent and involved board is 
essential for ensuring GE’s integrity, transparency and long-term 
strength.”The roles and responsibilities that independent non-executive 
directors have in companies are varied. The combined code outlines a 
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number of areas where independent non-executive directors should be 
present within a company which are: 
 
“A.3.2: Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board 
to be independent. A smaller company should have at least two independent 
non-executive directors.” Combined Code 2008.  
 
The independent non-executive directors are appointed to the board to 
attempt to ensure the directors act in the best interests of the shareholders. 
Some of their responsibilities include monitoring and challenging the 
performance of directors and the management team, challenging the status 
quo when necessary and reviewing financial performance against budgeted 
targets(For a full list see appendix III). 
 
“A.3.3: The board should appoint one of the independent non-executive 
directors to be the senior independent director.” Combined Code 2008. 
 
The role of the senior independent is to assess the performance of the 
board/chairperson and be available to shareholders if they believe their 
concerns are not being resolved through the normal channels of chairperson 
or managing director/ chief executive or if such contact is not appropriate 
The senior independent director should also act as the voice of the non 
executive directors and also act as the ‘conscience of the Board’.  
 
“A.4.1: There should be a nomination committee which should lead the 
process for board appointments and make recommendations to the board. A 
majority of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-
executive directors.” Combined Code 2008.   
 
The role of the nomination committee is to monitor, review and evaluate the 
structure, size and composition of the board and to lead the process for all 
board appointments (Executive, Non-Executive and Chairperson), and make 
recommendations to the board in this regard. Responsibilities of the 
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nomination committee include identifying and nominating candidate for vacant 
positions and assessing the time commitment for board/committee positions 
and ensuring that the candidate has sufficient time to fulfil them(For a full list 
see appendix III). 
 
“B.2.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee of at least three, 
or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive directors. 
Where remuneration consultants are appointed, a statement should be made 
available of whether they have any other connection with the company.” 
Combined Code 2008.  
 
The role of the remuneration committee is to advise the Board on the 
remuneration policies for the Managing Director/ Chief Executive, the 
Chairperson, Executive Directors, the Company Secretary and the members 
of the Management Team it is designated to consider. responsibilities of the 
remuneration committee include reviewing the suitability of performance 
measurement criteria for members of the management team and 
administering any share option schemes the company has for members of the 
management team(For a full list see appendix III). 
 
“C.3.1 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in 
the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors. In 
smaller companies the company chairman may be a member of, but not chair, 
the committee in addition to the independent non-executive directors, 
provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as 
chairman.” Combined Code 2008.  
 
The role of the audit committee is to monitor and review internal control, 
external audit, accounting and external reporting. Responsibilities of the audit 
committee include reviewing the effectiveness of the companies IT systems, 
internal controls, environmental affairs, legal matters, and pension investment 
performance and acting as a link between the board and its external 
auditors(For a full list see appendix III). 
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The combined code 2008 also outlines the role of the non-executive director, 
“As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors 
should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. Non-
executive directors should scrutinise the performance of management in 
meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of that 
performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial 
information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are 
robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining appropriate levels 
of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in appointing, 
and where necessary removing, executive directors, and in succession 
planning.” Combined code 2008. If the non-executive director carries out 
these roles while being independent they should greatly enhance the 
governance of the company. 
 
2.3.3 Do independent non-executive directors contribute to company 
effectiveness? 
  
Although the above would suggest that non-executive directors greatly 
increase company effectiveness, their effectiveness in practice has been 
widely debated. Support has come from many areas. Independence of 
members is intended to make the board and committee’s more effective and 
thus reduce the risk of failure; Uzan et al 2004 found “that the boards of 
companies that have not committed fraud have a higher percentage of outside 
and independent directors than do the boards of fraud companies.” This 
finding is consistent with Fama and with Fama and Jensen, who argued that 
higher percentages of independent directors increase the effectiveness of 
board oversight. A 2004 survey entitled effectiveness of independent directors 
found that 96% of companies believed that non-executive directors ensure 
compliance with governance and 82% believed they controlled a combined 
chairman/ CEO role. Loarch et al 2001 believes that unbalanced boards 
(dominated by inside directors) are increasing the risk of company failure by 
“compromising their ability to provide independent oversight and to act in the 
best long-term interests of the companies and their public shareholders.” 
Lorsch et al further adds that an unbalanced “board cannot be trusted to 
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monitor management’s decisions and actions objectively. This is particularly 
true when insiders are in control of the board’s compensation and audit 
committees.” These problems would be overcome by complying with the 
combined code. Higgs 2003 also believes “that a board is strengthened 
significantly by having a strong group of non-executive directors with no other 
connection with the company. These individuals bring a dispassionate 
objectivity that directors with a closer relationship to the company cannot 
provide.” 
 
However there is much criticism of the role. The arguments center on the 
ability of the non-executive director to carry out their role. Hooghiemstra & van 
Manen 2004 state that “regarding the provision of information, nonexecutive 
directors depend upon the management board. [...] If the management board 
intentionally withholds information, it is almost impossible [for non-executive 
directors] to find out.” This is backed up by Nowak and McCabe 2003 who 
found “that the CEO (and the executive board) has the controlling power over 
information”, which places restrictions on the independent members’ ability to 
do their job. Another frequent argument is that no director can be truly 
independent. This is due in part to an absence of any definition of 
independence and has resulted in people being appointed to the position of 
independent directors who were not independent such as “the non-executive 
who went to school or college with the director; or who is an executive director 
on a second board to which the chief executive on the first board belongs in a 
non-executive capacity.” Chambers and Weight 2008.  
2.4 The Irish experience. 
Ireland has like many other countries around the world felt the effects of the 
economic downturn. As a result the corporate governance policies of many 
companies has being called into question with more and more people calling 
for the combined codes comply and explain approach to be abandoned in 
favor of a legislative approach, “the Code should be enforceable by 
incorporating into legislation key provisions, such as the requirement for 
independent audit committees, and backing them with a framework of 
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effective sanctions for non-compliance;” Grant Thornton 2009.However 
speaking at a corporate governance conference the Tánaiste and Minister for 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Ms. Mary Coughlan stated that she 
believed a “comply or else” approach would only serve to hinder Irish 
business. She also pointed out that there is 97% compliance with the 
combined code amongst Irish companies (this contrasts with the findings of 
the Grant Thornton corporate governance review 2010) and that the 
European Commission and the “Risk Metrics 2009” assessment ranked 
Ireland in the top six Member States in terms of the quality of information 
disclosure and explanation. 
 However while most Irish listed companies claim compliance with the 
Combined Code, problems have arisen when some companies deviated from 
the principles of the code. In Ireland, post the Anglo Irish bank scandal Sean 
Fitzpatrick had to resign “from non-executive roles on the boards of public 
companies Smurfit Kappa, Aer Lingus and Greencore, as well as from 
Experian and Gartmore Irish Growth Fund. The directorships of FitzPatrick 
interlocked with those of former Anglo non-executives Gary McGann (Smurfit 
Kappa chief executive) and Ned Sullivan (Greencore chairman); FitzPatrick 
sat on their boards and they sat on his.” Slattery 2010. Furthermore in 2010 
Grant Thornton found that only 77% of companies had a board comprised of 
at least half independent non-executive directors, compared to 87% in 2009. 
Grant Thornton also found that a number of companies have “independent 
directors” who do not satisfy the combined codes’ independence criteria 
outlined above. 
 
2.5 Conclusion. 
 
The proper governance of companies is extremely important to the world 
economy. It is worth noting that 50%+ of the largest economies in the world 
are companies so the importance of proper corporate governance cannot be 
overlooked. Adherence to proper corporate governance procedures should 
ensure that the internal directors do not have unfettered powers and any 
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problems caused by “agency theory” will be minimized. This should ensure 
the company is run in the best interests of the shareholders. 
The combined code was issued to ensure that the governance of public 
companies is compliant with best practices in corporate governance. 
Companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange must state in their annual 
report whether or not they comply with the code. This comply or explain 
approach has “resulted in compliance with the letter of the guidance, but not 
its spirit,” Grant Thornton 2009. This is obviously not the intention and has led 
Grant Thornton to call for compliance with the code to be made a regularity 
requirement as Sarbanes-Oxely is in the United States. However in Ireland as 
proper governance is the overriding objective non-compliance is acceptable, 
“if good governance can be achieved by other means.” Combined code 2008. 
 
One of the main provisions of the code is the appointment of independent 
directors to various board position within the company i.e. company board and 
the audit, remuneration and nomination committees. However the success of 
this measure has received equal levels of support and criticism. Supporters 
believe that the presence of independent member on the boards and 
committees ensures the company cannot be dominated by individuals which 
had led to failures in the past e.g. Robert Maxwell and the failure of the 
Maxwell group of companies. However the provision is criticised as the 
independent members are reliant on the insider directors for the information. 
This allows insider directors to somewhat control the actions of independent 
members. Another of the main criticisms is that the term independence is not 
defined in the combined code and has led to many non independent people 
been made independent directors(a practice that has become well know in 
recent times due to various scandals including Sean Fitzpatrick and Anglo 
Irish bank). 
 
Corporate governance and in particular the independence requirements in 
spite of the various reports and codes is still a complex area with varying 
degrees of compliance and success. Corporate governance is also constantly 
changing and when the dust settles in the wake on the recent company 
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failures we will no doubt have another change in what is consider effective 
corporate governance. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology. 
 
3.1 Introduction. 
 
Research is a way of obtaining answers to a question. It can be defined as 
follows “an activity that we all undertake to learn more about our environment 
and the impact we have upon it (Ryan, B., Scapens, R.W., Theobald, M., 
2002). Research is about discovery and entails disagreement, criticism, 
chance and error (Ryan, B., Scapens, R.W., Theobald, M., 2002). 
Research methodology is: 
1. "the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates 
employed by a discipline" 
2. “the systematic study of methods that are, can be, or have been 
applied within a discipline" Websters dictionary. 
This chapter is devoted to the theoretical and conceptual considerations 
that affected the particular research design adopted so as to complete this 
study. 
3.1.1Research aims and objectives. 
 
• To determine if companies listed on the Irish Stock exchange are 
complying with the following requirements of the combined code 2008: 
 
o A.3.2: Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive 
directors determined by the board to be independent. A smaller 
company should have at least two independent non-executive 
directors.  
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o A.3.3: The board should appoint one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent director. 
 
o A.4.1: There should be a nomination committee which should 
lead the process for board appointments and make 
recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the 
nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
o B.2.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee of 
at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors. Where remuneration 
consultants are appointed, a statement should be made 
available of whether they have any other connection with the 
company.”  
 
• The number of years service a company believes it can receive from 
an independent non executive director and still regard them as 
independent. 
• The number of external boards a company believes an independent 
non executive director may participate in and still perform their roles 
and responsibilities effectively. 
3.1.2 Research design. 
Research Design: A plan for collecting and utilizing data so that desired 
information can be obtained with sufficient precision or so that a hypothesis 
can be tested properly. A research design will contain clear objectives, 
derived from your research question(s), specify the sources from which you 
intend to collect data and consider the constraints that the research will have 
as well as discussing ethical issues. Saunders et al 2007. 
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3.2 Research philosophy. 
The purpose and context of research can differ greatly from pure research 
involving the development and testing of a hypothesis, to applied research 
which is used in the social sciences and attempts to enhance our 
understanding of a situation, issue, problem or phenomena. 
The first step the researcher must take in their design of a research strategy is 
to identify the most suitable philosophy to pursue. 
3.2.1 Positivist research. 
A positivist approach to research is one that is suited to “working with an 
observable social reality and that the end product of such research can be law 
like generalizations similar to those produced by the physical and natural 
sciences” Remenyi et al 1998, p 32.It is a structured approach to data 
gathering which is analysed and interpreted in both a factual and statistical 
manner facilitating replication whereby repeated examination yields the same 
results. Therefore it is suited to the physical and natural sciences where there 
is one truth. A key distinction of this method is the fact that “the researcher is 
independent of and neither affects or is affected by the subject of the 
research” Remenyi et al 1998 pg 33. 
Other distinguishing features of the positivist approach are that is a deductive 
approach as it involves the development of a theory that is subjected to a 
rigorous test. Collis and Hussy 2003. It also uses “large samples, the location 
is artificial, reliability is high, validity is low and it generalizes from one sample 
to a population.” Hussy and Hussy 1997. 
3.2.2 Interpretive research (phenomenology). 
“Interpretivism is an epistemology that advocates that it is necessary for the 
researcher to understand differences between humans in our role as social 
actors.” Saunders et al 2007. It emphasizes the difference between 
conducting research among people rather than objects such computers. 
Interpretive research seeks to understand the subjective reality of those being 
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studied, making sense of their motives, actions, and intentions in a way that is 
meaningful to the research participants. Saunders et al 2003; Walliman 2001.  
Other distinguishing features is that an interpretive approach  accepts that 
there are many truths and that generalisability is not of crucial importance as 
the world is ever changing and cannot be reduced to law like generalizations. 
The following outlines the advantages and disadvantages of using either a 
positivism or an interpretive epistemology. 
 
Research 
Paradigm 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Positivism • Economical collection of 
large amounts of data 
• Clear theoretical focus for 
the researcher at the 
outset 
• Greater opportunity for 
researcher to retain 
control of research 
process 
• Inflexible- direction 
often cannot be 
changed once data 
collection has started 
• Weak at understanding 
social processes 
• Often does not 
discover the meanings 
people attach to social 
phenomena 
Phenomenology/ 
Interpretive 
• Facilitates understanding 
of how and why 
• Enables the researcher 
to be alive to changes 
which occur during the 
research process 
• Good at understanding 
social processes 
• Data collection can be 
time consuming 
• Data analysis is 
difficult 
• Researcher has to live 
with the uncertainty 
that clear patterns may 
not emerge 
• Generally perceived as 
less credible by non-
researchers’ 
(Saunders, M., Lewis, P., Thornhill, A., 2000). 
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3.2.3 Research philosophy adopted. 
The researcher has chosen the interpretive approach as it will enhance the 
researchers understanding of the varying approaches to corporate 
governance and independence within Irish public companies. Both the 
researcher and the participants could introduce bias to the findings using this 
approach as they interpret the questions in their own way. The research 
methodology and the research questions have been designed to limit this 
possibility. 
3.3 Research focus. 
The objective of the research has four main classifications. Exploratory, 
explanatory, descriptive and correlation. 
3.3.1 Exploratory studies. 
Exploratory research is a valuable means of finding out “what is happening; to 
ask questions and to access phenomena in a new light’ Robson 2002 pg 59. It 
is particularly useful to clarify an understanding of a problem, if unsure of its 
precise nature. Therefore it is often used to investigate the possibilities of 
undertaking a research study or to develop, refine or to test measurement 
tools or procedures. Kumar 1999. 
3.3.2 Explanatory studies. 
Explanatory studies aim to establish the causal relationship between 
variables. The emphasis is on studying a situation or a problem in order to 
explain the relationship between the variables. “Explanatory research 
attempts to clarify how and why there is a relationship between two aspects of 
a situation or phenomenon.” Kumar 1999. 
3.3.3 Descriptive studies. 
The objective of descriptive research is “to portray an accurate profile of 
persons, events or situations” Robson 2002 pg 59. It attempts to “describe  
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systematically a situation, problem, phenomenon, service, program or 
attitudes towards an issue. Kumar 1999. 
3.3.4 Correlation studies. 
Correlation refers to the extent to which two variables are related to each 
other. Therefore correlation research attempts to discover a relationship, 
association or interdependence between two or more aspects of a situation. 
Kumar 1999. 
3.3.5 Research focus adopted. 
Prior to any intensive research being carried out exploratory research was 
conducted to investigate the possibility of undertaking a research study in the 
selected area. 
Descriptive research will then be used to describe the level of compliance with 
the combined code amongst Irish public companies. 
3.4 Research tools 
3.4.1 Data required. 
The data required by the researcher will dictate the research tool(s) adopted. 
3.4.2 Qualitative. 
“…Qualitative researchers tend to select a few participants who can best shed 
light on the phenomenon under investigation. Both verbal data (interview 
comments, documents, field notes) and nonverbal data (drawings, 
photographs, videotapes) may be collected” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001, p. 102). 
Qualitative is used predominantly as a synonym for any data collection 
technique that generates or uses non-numerical data. 
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3.4.3 Quantitative. 
“Quantitative researchers identify one or a few variables that they intend to 
study and then collect data specifically related to those variables. Specific 
methods of measuring each variable are identified and developed, with 
attention to the validity and reliability of the measurement instruments. Data is 
collected from a population, (or from one or large samples that represent the 
population), in a form that is easily converted to numerical indices” (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2001, p. 102).  Quantitative is predominantly used as a synonym for 
any data technique that generates of uses numerical data. 
3.4.4 Information required. 
The information required in this research is quantitative in nature and since 
the study is descriptive in nature it provokes statistical and diagrammatical 
analysis. 
3.5 Data collection methods. 
There are two categories of data collection primary and secondary. The 
research will first consider primary research and the methods used for its 
collection.  
3.5.1 Primary data. 
There are several methods available for collecting primary data. The choice of 
method will depend on the purpose of the study, the resources available, the 
data required and the skills of the researcher. Each method has its own 
specific advantages and disadvantages and the researcher must select the 
method(s) that will provide the data required to answer the research question 
while considering their constraints 
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3.5.2 Interviews.  
“An interview is a purposeful discussion between two or more people.” Khan 
and Cannell 1957. Interviews are a useful data gathering technique as they 
are interactive allowing the interviewer or interviewee to clarify certain aspects 
of the data which cannot be done with other methods. This helps to increase 
the usefulness of the data as misunderstandings in the data gathering. 
Interviews can be used for both quantitative and qualitative data but is 
particularly relevant to qualitative data. Interview can be of three types, 
structured, semi-structured, and unstructured. 
3.5.3 Structured interview. 
“Structured interviews use questionnaires based on a predetermined and 
standardised or identical set of questions…” Saunders et al 2007. Questions 
are asked in a prescribed manner and interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee is kept to a minimum. Structured interviews are most often used 
to collect quantifiable data and are sometimes referred to as quantitative 
research interviews.  
3.5.4 Semi-Structured. 
In comparison to structured interviews, “semi-structured interviews are non-
standardised and although the researcher will have a list of themes and 
questions to be covered that may change from interview to interview” 
Saunders et al 2007. The order of the questions will change based on the flow 
of the interview and additional questions may be asked based on answers 
already give. Thus a semi-structures interview is much more interactive than a 
structured one. It is therefore more suitable to gathering qualitative data. 
3.5.5 Unstructured interviews. 
Unstructured interviews are completely interactive and informal. There is no 
predetermined list of questions and the interviewee if is given the opportunity 
to speak freely about events. It “suffers difficulties both in terms of data 
analysis, interviewer bias and comparability as each interviewee can be asked 
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different questions.” Kumar 1999. It is useful for exploratory research, 
research on sensitive topics and when little is known about the topic area. 
3.5.6 Questionnaires. 
“General term including all data collection techniques in which each person is 
asked to respond to the same questions in a predetermined order” Saunders 
et al 2007.”Questionnaires are usually not good for exploratory research or 
other research that requires large numbers of open ended questions.” 
Saunders et al 2007. Questionnaires “work best with standardised questions 
that you can be confident will be interpreted in the same way by all 
respondents.” Robson 2002. They require careful design to ensure a sufficient 
response from the population. 
3.6.1 Merits of questionnaires. 
• “Distributed to a large population. 
• Data is standardized enabling comparisons. 
• Data is easily analysed. 
• Quick and simple for respondent to complete. 
• Respondents have time to consider their answers. 
• Address a larger number of issues in an efficient way. 
• Permit anonymity, increasing the likelihood of genuinely held opinions.” 
Kumar 1999 
• Less expensive than other methods, especially if e-mail is used. 
3.6.2 Demerits of questionnaires. 
• “Response rate can be low. 
• Ambiguous questions are not clarified. 
• Spontaneous answers (which may be closer to the truth) are not 
obtained as there is time to reflect on answer. 
• Responses may be affected by other questions as respondents can 
read entire questionnaire before answering. 
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• Responses cannot be supplemented with other information.” Kumar 
1999. 
• It may be completed by someone other than the target respondent. 
 
 
3.7 Observation. 
“The systematic observation, recording, description, analysis and 
interpretation of people’s behaviour” Saunders 2007. Its emphasis is on 
discovering the meanings that people attach to their actions. There are two 
broad types of observation participant observation and structured observation. 
3.7.1 Participant observation. 
This is where the “researcher attempts to participate fully in the lives and 
activities of subjects and thus becomes a member of their group, organization 
or community.” Gill and Johnson 2002, pg 144. It is however used very little in 
business research. A participant can be either a: 
• Complete participant: A full member of the group who takes pain all 
activities 
• Complete observer: Not a member of the group and does not take part 
in but observes all activities. 
In the above two categories those being observed do not know the 
researchers identity or objectives. 
• Observer as participant: The researcher is essentially a spectator. 
• Participant as observer: The researcher takes part in the activities. 
In the above two categories those being observed know the researchers 
identity and objectives. 
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3.7.2 Structured observation. 
“Structured observation is concerned with the frequency of events. It is 
characterized by a high level of predetermined structure and quantitative 
analysis” Saunders et al 2007. It is useful for collection of data at the time that 
it occurs rather than relying on second hand accounts. However the research 
must be in the research setting at the time of the event. It is also a very slow 
and costly method of data collection. 
3.8 Case study. 
 
A case study is a study “that involves the empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, using multiple sources 
of evidence.” Saunders 2007. A case study involves an in-depth analysis of a 
particular firm. The researcher will use multi methods (interviews, 
questionnaires, observation and inspection of documents) to gain an in depth 
understanding of that particular organisation. A case study is a rich data 
source with much detailed information gathered however it suffers from bias 
both in the interpretation of the results and the data gathered(do workers 
behave differently when you are present and observing them). The researcher 
will have to ensure they remain independent in order for their findings to be 
reliable.  
3.9 Research tools adopted. 
After reviewing the research tools available, the researcher that 
questionnaires and interviews were best suited to the research question(s). 
Questionnaires were chosen as the method of data collection most 
appropriate for achieving the objectives of this study as the majority of the 
research questions are closed ended; the data is also descriptive and 
quantitative in nature. The population is geographically dispersed and 
questionnaires will provide the easiest access to this information. 
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3.10 Secondary data. 
Secondary data is “data used for a research project that was originally 
collected for some other purpose.” Saunders et al 2007. The value of the data 
used will depend on its source and author(s) (which influences it validity and 
reliability) and its relevance to the particular subject area. Secondary data can 
be documentary secondary data; survey based secondary data, and multiple-
source secondary data. 
3.10.1 Evaluation of secondary data. 
The researcher found a large volume of valid and reliable literature that had 
been peer reviewed and written by highly respected author(s). Some 
research did show bias, However this was balanced by sourcing articles 
supporting both sides of the issues relevant to the research. There was no 
shortage of literature on the research topic however there was a lack of 
information which focused on the Irish situation. This information however 
would be gathered during primary research so was not deemed to be a 
significant weakness of the secondary research. 
3.11 Questionnaire design. 
After examining the literature, the questionnaire was carefully designed by the 
researcher. All of the questions contained in the questionnaire are closed 
ended questions.  
The questions in the questionnaire are designed around the research 
question and objectives. Gaps in the literature were identified and the 
questions are designed to gather data that will fill these gaps. 
A pilot test was carried out prior to using the questionnaire for data collection. 
The purpose of the pilot test is to refine the questionnaire so that respondents 
will have no problems when answering the questions and there will be no 
problems in recording the data.  
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Post pilot testing the last question on the first link was changed to a 
remainder to the respondent to fill in the questions on the second link. The 
question relating to the effect that sitting on external boards had on 
independence was modified to determine what effect sitting on external 
boards had on independent non-executive effectiveness. 
3.11.1 Questions. 
A sample of the questionnaire can be found in appendix IV 
3.11.2 Research population. 
The research population is the 57 companies listed on the Irish stock 
exchange (see appendix I for complete list). 
3.11.3 Sampling process. 
Sampling is when items are selected at random from a population and used 
to test hypotheses about that population. Alternatively a census can be 
carried out which means applying the tests to the entire population. For this 
research a census will be carried out as all the companies are easily 
accessible and as the population in relatively small a census will give a 
greater chance of receiving the required response. 
3.11.4 Delivery method. 
The next task was to select the method by which the questionnaires would be 
sent to the target respondents. The following table outlines the methods 
available and there respective advantages and disadvantages: 
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Method. Advantages. Disadvantages. 
Through the post, fax, drop off, 
etc. 
Involves sending the questionnaire to 
predetermined respondents with a 
covering letter. Generally used when 
there are a large number of 
geographically dispersed 
respondents. 
Wider access and better 
coverage 
Provides anonymity 
Relatively low cost 
Larger sample size 
Respondents complete 
questionnaire at own pace 
Questionnaire must be simple 
Low response rate 
Points of clarification are not 
possible 
Follow-up of non-response is 
difficult 
In person. 
Requires face-to-face contact with 
respondents. Generally makes use of 
smaller samples to gather opinions 
and when dealing with sensitive 
issues 
Establish empathy and 
interest in the study 
Can probe complex issues 
Clarify respondents’ queries 
High response rate 
Expensive in time and cost 
May lead to interviewer bias 
Difficult to obtain wide access 
Relatively small sample size 
Over the telephone. 
A form of personal interviewing which 
is used to obtain information quickly. 
Generally used to gain access to 
respondents that are geographically 
dispersed. 
Provides personal contact 
Wide geographic coverage 
Easy and quick access 
Can be done with the aid of 
a computer 
Short interview time 
Limited to listed telephone 
owners 
Can be expensive 
Electronic. 
Administered via the intranet and 
internet through the use of email. An 
increasingly popular method for 
collecting data. 
Easy to administer 
Global reach 
Fast data collection 
No interviewer bias 
Low cost 
Loss of anonymity 
Can be complex to design and 
issue 
Limited to computer users 
(Hair Jr, J.F., Money, A.H., Samouel, P., Page, M., 2007). 
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The delivery method chosen was electronic as this offered the best chance of 
the necessary response rate. The use of e-mail also allowed the researcher to 
use the online survey site www.surveymonkey.com to administer the 
questionnaire. This had two advantages, firstly it allowed the questionnaire to 
be filled in electronically which reduced the time needed to respond thus it 
should increase the response rate and secondly it ensured full anonymity as 
respondents were not identified by the site. 
 
3.12 Data analysis. 
 
The researcher decided to use the computer program, Microsoft Excel, for 
data analysis. The package that hosts the online questionnaire displays the 
results in percentages. These percentages were then entered into Microsoft 
Excel to generate charts.As all research questions are closed they are already 
categorised. 
 
 3.13 Credibility of the research. 
Credibility refers to the objective and subjective components of the 
believability of a source or message. Traditionally, credibility has two key 
components: trustworthiness and expertise, which both have objective and 
subjective components. Raimond 1993 pg 55 subjects findings to the “how do 
I know? Test:…will the evidence and my conclusions stand up to the closest 
scrutiny?”. Gill and Johnson believe that “there exists no independent form of 
evaluating different research strategies in any absolute terms”. They do 
however suggest using validity, reliability and generalisabilty to assess the 
researches credibility. Thus to ensure the credibility of the research attention 
will to be paid to the validity, reliability and generalisability of the research 
conducted.  
3.14 Validity of the research. 
Validity can be defined as “ the extent to which the data collection method or 
methods accurately measures what they were intended to measure or the 
extent to which research findings are really about what they profess to be 
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about.” Saunders et al 2007. There are two types of validity: internal validity 
refers to the establishment of causal relationships and external validity refers 
to the extent to which the results of the research are applicable beyond the 
immediate setting of the research. 
3.15 Reliability of the research. 
Reliability is “the extent to which data collection technique or techniques will 
yield consistent findings, similar observations would be made or conclusions 
reached by other researchers or there is transparency in how sense was 
made from the raw data” Saunders et el 2007. Reliability of the research 
refers to the consistency of the results obtained. 
3.16 Generalisability. 
Generalisability is “the extent to which the findings of a research study are 
applicable to other settings.” Saunders et al 2007. 
3.17 Evaluation of the credibility of the research. 
Readers can evaluate the credibility of this research as they explore the links 
between the research question, the research objective, the field questions 
and the findings from the research methodology adopted. 
3.18 Ethical issues. 
Research ethics are “the appropriateness of the researcher’s behavior in the 
relation to the rights of those who become the subject of the research project, 
or who are affected by it” Saunders et al 2007. The methods chosen for this 
research will be subject approval from an ethics committee to ensure it is 
carried out in an ethical manner. 
3.19 Limitations of the research. 
The researcher had the constraints of time (being a student with a part time 
job), financial (privately funded) and human resources (only one researcher). 
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The research methods were chosen to provide the highest quality results 
while minimizing the impact of those constraints. 
Other limitations include the dispersed geographical location of the target 
population. 
The research is also subject to the limitations that questionnaires suffer from 
(which are highlighted above) which may affect the credibility of the research. 
3.20 Conclusion. 
 
This research was carried out to determine the degree to which companies 
listed on the ISEQ comply with the independence requirements of the 
Combined Code 2008. The research will take the form of interpretative 
research using the inductive approach. It will be exploratory in nature leading 
o descriptive research. The data will be quantitative establishing the variations 
in compliance and will be presented in statistical and diagrammatical form. 
Survey and questionnaires are the research tools adopted to collect the 
primary data. Questionnaires will be distributed to the entire population. Data 
will be analysed using Microsoft excel. 
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Chapter 4. 
Analysis and Findings. 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to study and analyse the data collected during 
the primary research. This will involve an examination of the questionnaire 
responses in order to determine the level of compliance amongst Irish public 
listed companies with the independence requirements of Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. 
 
4.2 Analysis of survey results. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to the 57 companies listed on the Irish Stock 
Exchange (A list of the companies to who the questionnaire was sent to along 
with a copy of the questionnaire is contained in appendix I). At the end of the 
data collection period a total of 20 responses were received, yielding a 
34.48% response rate (response results can be found in Appendix V). 
 
The questionnaires were sent to the head of investor relations in each 
company as corporate governance is most associated with investors relations 
as opposed to the other heads e.g. finance, marketing. 
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Respondent were first asked to identify whether their companies complied 
with the Combined Code or Sarbanes Oxley Act. (As Irish companies with a 
listing on an American Stock Exchange are required to comply with the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002). 17(85%) companies complied with the Combined 
code whilst 3(15%) complied with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
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The next twelve questions focused on determining whether companies 
comply with various sections of the combined code. 
 
Questions 2 and 3 deal with section A.3.2 of the combined code which states 
that “Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board 
to be independent. A smaller company should have at least two independent 
non-executive directors”. 
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All companies have a board of directors in excess of five members with a 
majority [50% (10)] of companies having a board of between ten and fifteen 
members. 
 
The following question aimed to determine how many of these members were 
independent non executive directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As all companies listed on the stock exchange would be regarded as big 
companies so they should as per the combined code have a board made up 
of at least half independent non executive directors. With the size of boards 
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being between five and fifteen members the number of independent non 
executive directors present on the board would be expected to be between 
three and eight (if the combined codes provisions are followed).The results 
conform to this expectation as the number of independent non executive 
directors present on the board as per the results conformed to these 
expectations. 
 
Further analysis of the results shows full compliance in this area. Taking the 
results from question two and using the provision in A.3.2 to determine the 
expected levels of independent non executive directors and then cross 
referencing the expected results with the actual results from question three we 
see that companies are fully compliant in this area. This is represented in the 
following table: 
 
Number of 
companies 
Number of board 
members. 
Number of 
expected 
independent non 
executive board 
members. 
Number of companies 
with expected number of 
independent non 
executive board 
members. 
10 10-15 5-8 12 
3 8-10 4-5 - 
7 5-7 3-4 8 
 
Some companies have a board made up of in excess of 50% independent 
non executive directors with 20% (4) companies having between ten and 
fifteen independent board members. 
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Question 4 deals with section A.3.3 of the combined code which states “The 
board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be 
the senior independent director. The senior independent director should be 
available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact through the 
normal channels of chairman, chief executive or finance director has failed to 
resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the responses received 13(65%) companies had a senior independent 
director whilst 7(35%) did not.  
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Questions 5, 6 and 7 deals with section C.3.1of the combined code which 
states that “The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or 
in the case of smaller companies, two independent non-executive directors. In 
smaller companies the company chairman may be a member of, but not chair, 
the committee in addition to the independent non-executive directors, 
provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as 
chairman.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As expected given the importance to a business of an audit 100% (20) of 
companies that responded have an audit committee in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A majority of companies 90% (18) have an audit committee of between three 
and four members whilst the remainder have an audit committee in excess of 
six members. 
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Companies in this area are not fully complying with section C.3.1 as their 
audit committees are not made up exclusively of independent non executive 
directors. Instead companies have opted for an audit committee made up of a 
majority of independent non executive directors 
 
Questions 8, 9 and 10 deal with section B.2.1 of the combined code which 
states “The board should establish a remuneration committee of at least 
three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive 
directors. Where remuneration consultants are appointed, a statement should 
be made available of whether they have any other connection with the 
company.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 20 companies (100%) that responded have a remuneration committee in 
place. 
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Each company has a remuneration committee of in excess of three members 
as prescribed by section B.2.1. A majority of companies 80% (16) have a 
remuneration committee of between three and four members whilst the 
remainder have an audit committee in excess of five members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the audit committee not every company has a remuneration 
committee made up exclusively of non independent directors, instead having 
a mix of independent and non independent members. However their 
remuneration committees are made up of a majority of independent non 
executive directors which should ensure that they carry out their duties in the 
desired way however as with audit committees the committees’ objectivity will 
be reduced due to the presence of non independent directors on the 
committee. 
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Questions 11, 12 and 13 deal with section A.4.1of the combined code “There 
should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for board 
appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of 
members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the companies who responded 18(90%) had a nomination committee 
whilst 2(10%) have no such committee. This is the first instance of companies 
not having one of the committees outlined in the combined code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All companies have a nomination committee of in excess of three members as 
prescribed by section A.4.1 with 100% (18) companies having a nomination of 
between three and four members. 
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Companies in this area have followed the combined codes recommendations 
with a majority of members on the nomination committee being independent 
non executive directors. 
 
Questions 14 and 15 deal with the independence and effectiveness of 
independent board members and is critical to the success of corporate 
governance as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is one area where the combined code does not prescribe any 
requirements so as expected the responding companies have varying views. 
With regards to the number of external boards an independent non executive 
may sit on a majority of companies 50% (10) believed that participating on 
between five and six external boards is the maximum before an independent 
director’s ability to operate effectively is reduced. However 15% (3) believed 
that independent directors may sit on in excess of six external boards. 
How many members present on your nomination 
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In this area the combined does prescribe some independence tests (as 
outlined in the literature review) but a complete definition of what constitutes 
independence is not provided. With regard to terms of service 85% (17) 
companies believed that an independent director could still remain 
independent after in excess of six years service. However the other 15% (3) 
believed that between three and four years was the longest an independent 
non executive directors before their independence became impaired.                 
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Chapter 5. 
Recommendations and conclusions. 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
 
In this chapter the main findings of the research are summarised and linked to 
the literature, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made. 
Furthermore suggestions for further areas of research are derived based on 
the findings of the study. 
 
A review of the literature led to the following research question and objectives: 
 
My research question is  
• To what extent do companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
comply with the independence requirements of combined code? 
 
My research objectives: 
 
• To determine if companies listed on the Irish Stock exchange are 
complying with the follow requirements of the combined code 2008: 
 
o A.3.2: Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive 
directors determined by the board to be independent. A smaller 
company should have at least two independent non-executive 
directors.  
o A.3.3: The board should appoint one of the independent non-
executive directors to be the senior independent director. 
o A.4.1: There should be a nomination committee which should 
lead the process for board appointments and make 
recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the 
nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors.  
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o B.2.1: The board should establish a remuneration committee of 
at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors. Where remuneration 
consultants are appointed, a statement should be made 
available of whether they have any other connection with the 
company.”  
 
• The number of years service a company believes it can receive from 
an independent non executive director and still regard them as 
independent. 
• The number of external boards a company believes an independent 
non executive director may participate in and still perform their roles 
and responsibilities effectively. 
 
This was achieved through an extensive review of the literature related to the 
topic area and also through primary research collected via questionnaires 
administered to companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. 
 
5. 2 Conclusions. 
 
Upon review of the findings the researcher discovered a high level of 
compliance with the requirements of the combined code within Irish listed 
companies. All companies complied with either the combined code or with the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act. However there are a number of areas where companies 
are not complying fully with the combined codes requirements. 
 
All companies were compliant with provision A.4.1, with some companies 
having more than half the board of directors made up of independent non 
executive directors. However the benefit of this is undermined by the varying 
views on the effectiveness of independent directors as outlined in the 
literature review and discussed later in this chapter. 
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In relation to the various committees outlined in the combined code all 
companies were compliant with the related combined code provisions (apart 
from two companies who did not have a nomination committee). The 
committees all had in excess of the required three members. However 
companies did not fully comply with the requirement to have the committees 
made up exclusively of independent non executive directors with companies 
instead preferring to have committee made up of a majority of independent 
non executive directors. 
 
This presents a number of problems as the presence of non independent 
directors on the committees reduced their objectivity and may lead to 
decisions being made which are not in the best interest of the shareholders. 
Also the presence of non independent directors and the questionable 
independence of the so called independent members could lead to the 
committees being controlled by the directors, removing their effectiveness in 
protecting the interests of shareholders. 
 
One area where there was a lack of compliance was in the appointment of a 
senior independent director. The senior independent director is an important 
point of contact for disgruntled shareholders with other roles ranging from 
leading the other independent directors in a review of the chairman’s 
performance and developing knowledge of all major shareholders concerns 
so these can be addressed at board. Given the importance of the role (and 
the recent increase in disgruntled shareholders), I would have expected a 
greater number of companies to have appointed a senior independent 
director. 
 
One area where companies had differing views was in relation to the number 
of external boards an independent non executive director may sit on and still 
be effective and to the length of service a company could receive from an 
independent non executive director. Given that it is the ability of independent 
non executive directors to do their job effectively and their independence is at 
the heart of the combined code the researcher believes that more uniformity 
in this area is needed. If there is a failure in either of these areas the entire 
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corporate governance system of the company is compromised and will be 
deemed ineffective.  
 
All companies agreed that independent directors could sit on in excess of 
three boards and still be effective at ensuring strong governance within the 
company. However 50% (10) believed that participating on between five and 
six external boards is acceptable while 15% (3) believed that independent 
directors may sit on in excess of six external boards. This area has received a 
lot of attention recently, due to the fact that many independent non executive 
directors were sitting on an excessive number of boards which affected their 
ability to perform their role effectively and their independence (due to the fact 
that persons often sit on each others boards) e.g. Sean Fitzpatrick who sat on 
the boards of Anglo Irish Bank, Smurfit Kappa, Aer Lingus, food group 
Greencore, Gartmore Irish Growth Fund and the DDDA. Recently the financial 
regulator Matthew Elderfield and the European commission have released 
proposals to limit the number of boards on which a director may sit on at one 
time to three or less. Mr Elderfield has even proposed that the chairman of 
financial institutions be prohibited from sitting on any other boards. Both sets 
of proposals are currently out for public consultation so they may be amended 
before introduction however they do highlight the need for reform in this area.  
 
 
With regard to the number of years service a company may receive from 
independent non executive directors there is again varying views. The 
combined code in outlining independence test suggested a period of nine 
years service may be obtained from independent non-executive directors 
before independence is impaired. The research found that 85% of companies 
believe a service period of over six years was acceptable, while the remaining 
15% believed that between three and four years was acceptable. These are 
widely varying opinions and the researcher believes more uniformity is 
needed in this area in order to ensure a strong system of governance exists 
within listed companies. The researcher believes that the length of service 
allowable from independent non executive directors need to be defined more 
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precisely and reduced from the nine years outlined in the combined code. 
Nine years is an excessively long time in the business world.  
 
Business planning takes place in three phases: operational (day to day), 
tactical (1-2years) and strategic (5 years plus). Under the combined codes 
provisions independent directors may sit on a board for a period exceeding 
the companies’ strategic outlook. This means that independent directors will 
be on the board from the start to the end of the project and have been 
involved in decisions on the project at all stages of its development. This is 
effectively leading to a situation where independent directors are reviewing 
their own work and thus the researcher believes they will lose their objectivity 
in analysing the projects progress.  Mr Elderfield has proposed that board 
appointments be reviewed every three years while the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
2002 the term of office of directors is limited to five years and no director may 
serve for more than two terms (whether consecutive or not). 
 
 
Overall the results show that compliance amongst Irish companies with the 
combined code is high with companies (with a few exceptions) being fully 
compliant with the investigated areas. This surprised the researcher after 
reviewing the literature and in the light of recent corporate scandals (such as 
occurred in Anglo Irish Bank, DCC and the Quinn group (see appendix II for 
more detailed information on the scandals)) in Ireland it was expected that 
more companies would not have complied all of the requirements of the 
Combined Code. The researcher believes this is due to companies complying 
with the minimum requirements of the combined code but not putting much 
emphasis on them in practice. The researcher believes this is due to the 
“comply or explain” approach which has led companies to do just enough so 
that no “explaining” is necessary. This is supported by Grant Thornton who 
found that the comply or explain approach “resulted in compliance with the 
letter of the guidance, but not its spirit,” Grant Thornton 2009. 
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5.3 Recommendations. 
 
1. This research highlights the fact that although the combined code has 
its reasons for adopting a “comply or explain” approach (as outlined in 
the literature review), it has led to a situation where companies can 
claim full compliance when they are far from compliant. They are 
compliant in body but not spirit. The researcher believes that the 
combined code must have some legislative backing if it is ever to be 
fully effective. The legislative backing need not cover the entire 
combined code just what I believe to be the key areas i.e. 
independence requirements and the make up of boards and 
committees (the researchers recommendations in these areas are 
outlined below). Legislative backing and penalties for non compliance 
in these areas should ensure the combined code is complied with in 
body and sprit. 
 
2. The researcher would recommend that all committees are made up of 
exclusively with non independent directors being prohibited from 
performing any role directly or indirectly in these committees. These 
requirements should be backed by legislation as above to ensure 
compliance is achieved. The financial regulator in his consolation paper 
has proposed that the committees be made up of a majority of 
independent non-executive directors. I believe that a committee made 
up exclusively of independent non executive directors would be much 
more objective in its decision making and serve the needs of the 
shareholders better. Also at the present time companies have 
committee with a majority of independent members which as high 
lighted a number of times above has led to problems leading the 
researcher to believe that a new approach as outlined above is 
needed. 
 
3. The researcher agrees with the proposals of both the financial 
regulator and the European commission that would limit the number of 
boards a director may sit on to three or less. This will have a two fold 
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effect. Firstly it will ensure that directors have the necessary time 
available to perform their duties in a professional manner. Secondly it 
will minimise any effect being had on independence due to interlocking 
directorships (directors becoming linked due to sitting on each others 
boards). These requirements should be backed by legislation as above 
to ensure compliance is achieved. 
 
4. The researcher believes that a maximum service period of three years 
being imposed for independent non executive directors. The 
researcher believes that a service period of three years will ensure that 
independent non executive directors will remain objective when making 
decisions on company policies and investments and will remove self 
review. Like the Sarbanes Oxley the researcher would not prevent the 
same independent non executive director from serving more than one 
term, but unlike the Sarbanes Oxley Act would not allow them to serve 
consecutive terms and would recommend a period of six years 
between terms. This is to eliminate any self review and ensure that 
objectivity is present. Again these requirements should be backed by 
legislation as above to ensure compliance is achieved. 
 
5. The researcher would encourage both the regulators and the 
government to ensure that companies are made aware of the 
importance of having a senior independent non executive director and 
they should be encouraged to appoint one. However the researcher 
would not recommend that this be enforced by legislation as it is 
unlikely to lead to corporate governance failure due to non compliance 
while the recommendations outlined above may lead to such a failure. 
 
 
The researcher would like to highlight the fact that although the above 
recommendations are the researcher believes necessary to ensure proper 
corporate governance other areas such as competiveness need to be taken 
into account. A difficult balance needs to be achieved between the need for 
regulation and the need for free markets. Upon introduction of the Sarbanes 
65 
 
Oxley Act in 2002 (which is backed by legislation) led some companies to 
delist from the American stock exchanges as the requirements were too 
onerous while Piotroski 2008 found that “following the act's passage, smaller 
international companies were more likely to list in stock exchanges in the U.K. 
rather than U.S. stock exchanges”. On December 21st, 2008 a Wall street 
journal editorial stated, "The new laws and regulations have neither prevented 
frauds nor instituted fairness. But they have managed to kill the creation of 
new public companies in the U.S., cripple the venture capital business, and 
damage entrepreneurship”.  
 
At this present time any adverse effect on competiveness or the countries’ 
economy would be disastrous and care will have to be taken to ensure any 
adverse affect due to regulation would be minimised. It should be 
remembered that Sean Fitzpatrick argued against regulation saying it would 
destroy the banking industry and look what happened. I believe my 
recommendations would enhance competitiveness and economic 
development in the long run. The researcher heard a quote that said “What 
makes a bad leader is not bad decision making, but an absence of decision 
making ”. The researcher would strongly advise that the above 
recommendations be implemented by Ireland’s leadership now while there is 
a desire and a willingness to change amongst the affected parties. Any 
changes made (successful or unsuccessful) can be changed or adapted but 
the negative impact that failure to act will have on Irelands economy and 
international  image will irreversible. The above recommendations in the 
researchers opinion would greatly reduce the risk of such failures as 
described throughout this paper from happening again and put Ireland at the 
forefront of corporate governance regulation.  
 
5.4 Further areas of research. 
 
While this research is a comprehensive study into the degree to which 
companies listed on the ISEQ comply with the independence requirements of 
the Combined Code 2008, the researcher believes that the study would have 
benefited from knowing: 
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• The requirements each non executive director had to fulfil in order to 
be regarded as independent. 
• The exact number of both independent and non independent members 
on the board and committees of each company. 
• The actual number of external boards sat on by independent non 
executive directors and their length of service to each company. 
 
This would have eliminated the need for any generalising and would have 
enabled more detailed recommendations to be made. This could have being 
achieved by a combination of a detailed questionnaire and a detailed analysis 
of each companies published annual report, however the limitations of the 
research such as time, money and geographical location prevented the 
researcher from following this methodology. 
 
Also while corporate governance is well documented in the literature, the 
researcher struggled to source specific literature relating to the Irish 
experience in this area. Given Irelands’ economic boom and bust over the last 
two decades, a study into the role that corporate governance and the 
combined code played in developments would be an interesting area of study 
as it would highlight both the positive and negative roles that corporate 
governance played in the development of Irelands economy and its recent 
failure.  
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Appendices. 
Appendix I. 
Company List. 
 
List of companies on the Irish Stock exchange as per RTE 
(http://www.rte.ie/business/markets/iseq.html) 
1. Abbey 
2. Aer Lingus Group plc 
3. AGI Therapeutics 
4. Allied Irish Bank 
5. Aminex 
6. Aryzta AG 
7. Bank of Ireland 
8. Blackrock International Land 
9. Boundary Capital Plc  
10. C&C Group 
11. Conroy Diamonds & Gold 
12. CPL Resources 
13. CRH 
14. Datalex 
15. DCC 
16. Donegal Creameries 
17. Dragon Oil 
18. Elan Corporation Plc 
19. FBD Holdings 
20. First Derivatives Plc 
21. Fyffes 
22. Galnbia 
23. Grafton Group plc 
24. Greencore Group 
25. ICON 
26. IFG group 
27. Independent News and Media Plc 
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28. Irish Continental Group plc 
29. Irish Life and Permanent Group Holdings Plc 
30. Karelian Diamond 
31. Kenmare Resources 
32. Kerry Group 
33. Kingspan Group 
34. McInerney Holdings 
35. Merrion Pharmaceuticals 
36. Norkom Group 
37. Oglesby & Butler Group 
38. Origin Enterprises Plc 
39. Ormonde Mining 
40. Ovoca Gold Plc 
41. Paddy Power 
42. Petroceltic International Plc 
43. Petroneft Resources 
44. Prime Active Capital 
45. Providence Resources 
46. Readymix 
47. Real Estate Opportunities Plc 
48. Ryanair Holdings 
49. Siteserv Plc 
50. Smurfit Kappa Group Plc 
51. Total Produce 
52. Tullow Oil Plc 
53. TVC Holdings Plc 
54. United Drug 
55. UTV Media Plc 
56. Worldspreads Group Plc 
57. Zamano Plc. 
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Appendix II. 
Corporate Governance Issues. 
 
Anglo Irish Bank. 
Seán FitzPatrick has resigned as Chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, following a 
continuing investigation of directors' loans at the bank. He also resigned from 
the boards of Smurfit Kappa, Aer Lingus, food group Greencore and Gartmore 
Irish Growth Fund at the same time. 
 The garda/ODEC investigation covers the following: 
1. The Golden Circle share transaction in which 10 clients of the bank 
purchased 10% of the bank's shares using loans from the bank. The 
stake was bought from businessman Sean Quinn. Sean Fitzpatrick was 
a central figure in this arrangement. 
2. Hiding directors' loans from shareholders – including FitzPatrick's – by 
transferring them for short terms to Irish Nationwide at year-end. 
FitzPatrick insists that this did not breach banking or legal regulations 
but admits it was inappropriate and unacceptable from a transparency 
point of view. Directors’ loans at September 30, 2008, amounted to 
€150 million. €87 million in loans between the bank and Irish 
Nationwide Building Society over an eight-year period, to avoid 
amounts appearing in the year-end accounts. 
3. The lodgement of €7.45bn in short term deposits by IL&P to the 
nationalised bank in September 2008. 
In January 2009 the government announced plans to nationalise Anglo Irish 
Bank instead of recapitalising it as unacceptable practices within the bank had 
caused it serious damage which recapitalisation could not repair. 
Anglo Irish Bank were also involved along with the Dublin Docklands 
Development Authorities’(DDDA) purchase of the glass bottle site in 
Ringsend, Dublin 4(the site was purchased by the Becbay consortium of 
which the DDDA was a part). Anglo loaned money to the DDDA to purchase 
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its equity in the deal. Mr Fitzpatrick and Mr Bradshaw were directors of both 
Anglo Irish bank and the Dublin Docklands Development Authority at the time 
of the loans. 
The investigation into the above events are still ongoing so the cause of the 
events are at this point in time are unknown. However corporate governance 
experts have stated that the board let Mr. Fitzpatrick run AIB as he saw fit and 
seemed either unwilling or not able to control his actions. If this is true the 
board and all committees (even though they were in accordance with the 
combined code) were ineffective in discharging their roles and responsibilities. 
In relation to the loan deal with the DDDA corporate governance experts claim 
“that conflicts of interest as blatant as cross directorships of this nature will fall 
foul of future legislation.” Walsh J 2010. 
The failure in corporate governance is also highlighted by the fact that even 
after all Mr. Fitzpatrick’s wrongdoings were exposed the board still showed 
him support and accepted his resignation “with regret”, instead of demanding 
his resignation as it was in the interest of the shareholders whose interests 
the board is supposed to protect. 
DCC. 
This corporate governance issues at DCC relate to Mr. Jim Flavins’ dealing in 
shares of Fyffes. At the time Mr. Flavin was a director of DCC and a non-
executive director of Fyffes (a position he held for 19 years). The Fyffes case 
relates to the intra-group transfer of the Fyffes’ shares by DCC in 1995 and 
their ultimate disposal in 2000. “The Supreme Court, overturning decision by 
the High Court, found that two trading reports, which Jim Flavin had in his 
possession as a director of Fyffes at the time of the sale of 31,169,493 shares 
in Fyffes in 2000, were price sensitive. Thus Mr.Flavin was guilty of insider 
trading. As a result of the Supreme Court decision, DCC was obliged to pay to 
Fyffes a sum that was to be determined by the High Court, relating to the 
profits on the sale”. DCC annual report 2009. 
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The corporate governance problems do not related directly to the insider 
trading but more so with the attitudes of the board of directors with regard to 
Mr. Flavins ultimate resignation. As with AIB and Mr. Fitzpatrick the board 
seemed reluctant to see Mr. Flavin resign and wanted him to stay on as 
director until 2010 at least. This is a man who was guilty of insider trading and 
in the interest of shareholders the board should of encourages his resignation 
not tried to prevent it. Mr. Flavin was a founding member of DCC and 
instrumental in its success but the board is there to protect shareholders and 
past performance should not board members a right to act as they please. 
The case also highlights the risk of cross directorships. Such directorships 
give directors access to such price information which could be used to make 
illegal gains on the financial markets.  
Quinn Group. 
 
The Quinn group suffered from a problem similar to AIB. Sean Quinn was the 
mastermind behind Quinn groups’ remarkable growth (as Sean Fitzpatrick 
was the mastermind behind Anglo Irish Banks’ growth) and was effectively 
given a free reign over how the company was run. However after a number of 
well documented bad decisions (e.g. certain subsidiaries of Quinn Insurance 
giving guarantees which had the effect of reducing the insurer's assets by 
around €448m.) the financial regulator put Quinn insurance into 
administration. After years of operation the Quinn group made sweeping 
changes to its board “to implement governance structures that resembled 
those of a publicly listed company. “ Quinn S 2008. This case again highlights 
an inability or an unwillingness of boards to control dominating board 
members. 
 
This case also highlights issues faced by the regulator when trying to regulate 
the business within the letter of the law. The regulators decision to place 
Quinn insurance in administration led to protests outside Quinn HQ and 
government buildings over fear off job losses and the damaging effect closure 
would have on the Irish economy. Even though the regulators decision was 
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correct within the letter of the law, economic factors should always play an 
important role in any action taken. 
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Appendix III. 
Responsibilities of independent non executive directors. 
 
• Bring a genuine independent perspective to enhance decision making, 
• Provide value added input to strategy and strategic development, 
• Act in the best interests of the company as a whole rather than any one 
particular group of shareholders, 
• Assist in carrying out the duties of the Board, such as: 
– reviewing, approving and on-going monitoring of the strategic plan, 
– reviewing organisational capability in relation to stated objectives, 
– reviewing financial performance against targets, 
– raising capital, 
– reviewing any major changes in the company, such as financial and 
organisation structure, 
– providing advice on major investments/divestments to be made, 
– monitoring legal, ethical, risk and environmental compliance where 
appropriate, 
• Act as a catalyst for change and challenge the status quo, when 
appropriate, 
• Monitor and challenge the performance of Executive Directors and the 
Management Team, 
• Take an active role in the appointment and replacement of key senior 
management and in plans for management development and 
succession, 
• Attend Board Committee meetings, as appropriate (a Non Executive 
Director may also have special responsibility for audit, nomination 
and/or remuneration committees), 
• Attend Board meetings, ad hoc meetings with the Chairperson, and 
meetings of Non Executive Directors, as appropriate, 
• Satisfy themselves that financial information is accurate and that 
financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible, 
• Maintain the confidentiality of information received, 
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• Carry out functions with due skill, care and diligence, 
• Devote sufficient time to responsibilities. 
 
Responsibilities of the nomination committee. 
 
• Review the structure, size and composition of the Board and make 
recommendations to the Board, 
• Evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the 
Board, 
• Identify and nominate candidates to fill Board vacancies when required.  
• The Board will subsequently review and approve the nominations, as 
appropriate, 
• Give full consideration to succession planning for Directors and other 
senior executives, 
• Prepare a description of roles and capabilities for particular 
appointments, 
• Assess the time commitments of the Board posts and ensure that the 
candidate has sufficient available time to undertake them, 
• Ensure that on appointment to the Board, Non Executive Directors 
receive a formal letter of appointment setting out clearly what is 
expected of them in their role, 
• Assess the leadership needs of the company in terms of the ability of 
the company to compete in its industry, 
• Keep abreast of issues affecting the industry in which the company 
operates. 
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Responsibilities of the Remuneration committee. 
 
• Determine and agree with the Board the framework or broad policy for 
the remuneration of the Managing Director/ Chief Executive, the 
Chairperson, Executive Directors, the Company Secretary and other 
members of the Management Team it is required to consider, 
• The Remuneration of Non Executive Directors shall be a matter for the 
Chairperson and the Executive Members of the Board (see B2.3 of the 
Combined Code (2003)), 
• Produce an annual report on the agreed remuneration policy, 
• Determine the total individual remuneration package of each Executive 
Director, 
• Review the suitability of performance measurement criteria for 
members of the Management Team, 
• Review the notice periods for Executive Director employment 
contracts, 
• Determine compensation arrangements for early termination of 
employment contracts, 
• Review company organisational changes, 
• Administer share option scheme(s) for members of the Management 
Team and/or Directors. 
 
Responsibilities of the Audit committee. 
 
• Report to the Board on all matters covered by the Terms of Reference, 
• Monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company 
• Monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal financial 
controls function and assess key financial risks, 
• Monitor the strategic direction of the internal audit function, 
• Review major audit issues and accounting policies.  
• Where the Audit Committee’s monitoring and review activities reveal 
cause for concern or scope for improvement, it should make 
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recommendations to the Board on action needed to address the issues 
or to make improvements, 
• Review the effectiveness of IT systems, internal controls, 
environmental affairs, legal matters and pension investment 
performance, 
• Review company compliance with ethics, regulations, policies and 
practice reviews, 
• Act as the link between the Board and the external auditors, 
• Monitor and review the external auditor’s independence, objectivity and 
effectiveness, 
• Make recommendations to the Board to be put to the shareholders for 
their approval in relation to the appointment of the external auditor and 
to approve their remuneration and terms of engagement, 
• Consider external auditor’s management letter and management 
responses, 
• Develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external 
auditor to supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant 
ethical guidance, 
• Meet with the external auditors twice a year, once at the planning stage 
and once post-audit at reporting stage, 
• Non Executive Directors of the Audit Committee should meet the 
external auditors at least annually without the presence of any 
executive Board members, 
• The Chairperson of the Audit Committee should attend the AGM, 
• Under the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003 (when 
commenced) the Board Audit Committee will be responsible for 
reviewing (before its approval by the Board of Directors) the Directors’ 
compliance statement (see Section 3.3) and determining whether the 
system etc complies with the acts’ requirements, is fair and reasonable 
and is based on due and careful enquiry.  
• The Board Audit Committee will be responsible for recommending to 
the Board whether or not the compliance statement should be 
approved by them. 
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Appendix IV. 
Draft Questionnaire. 
 
1. Does your company comply with either of the following? 
Combined 
Code 
Sarbanes-
Oxely 
Other 
   
 
2. How many members are present on your board of directors? 
 
Less than five Five-Seven Eight-Ten Ten-Fifteen Fifteen + 
     
 
 
3. How many members present on your board of directors are independent 
non executive directors? 
 
 
4. Does your company have a senior independent 
director?  
 
 
 
5. Does your firm have and audit committee?   
 
 
6.  How many members are present on your audit committee? 
 
Less than Two Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
 
Less than five Five-Seven Eight-Ten Ten-Fifteen Fifteen + 
     
Yes No 
  
Yes No 
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7. How many members present on your audit committee are independent non 
executive directors? 
 
 
 
 
8. Does your firm have a remuneration 
committee?    
 
 
 
9. How many members are present on your remuneration committee? 
 
Less than 
Two 
Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
 
10. How many members present on your remuneration are independent non 
executive directors? 
 
 
 
 
11. Does your firm have a nomination committee? 
 
 
 
12. How many members are present on your nomination committee? 
 
Less than Two Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
 
 
Less than Two Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
Yes No 
  
Less than 
Two 
Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
Yes No 
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13. How many members present on your nomination committee are 
independent non executive directors? 
 
 
 
 
14. How many external boards may a non-executive director sit on and still be 
an effective non executive director? 
 
 
15. How many years may a non-executive director serve as such still be 
regarded as independent? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Less than Two Three-Four Five-Six Six Plus 
    
Less than two Three-four Five to Six Six+ 
    
 
Less than two Three-four Five to Six Six+ 
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Appendix V. 
 
Question 1 
Does your company comply with either of the 
following?     
 Combined Code 17    
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 3    
      
Question 2 
How many persons are present on your board of 
directors?    
 Less than five 0    
 Five-Seven 7    
 Eight-Ten 3    
 Ten-Fifteen 10    
 Fifteen Plus 0    
      
Question 3 
How many members present on your board of directors  
are independent non executive directors? 
 Less than five 8    
 Five-Seven 6    
 Eight-Ten 2    
 Ten-Fifteen 4    
 Fifteen Plus 0    
      
Question 4 
Does your company have a senior independent 
director?     
 Yes 13    
 No 7    
      
Question 5 Does your firm have and audit committee?     
 Yes 20    
 No 0    
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Question 6 How many persons are present on your audit 
committee? 
 Less than two 0    
 Three-four 18    
 Five-six 0    
 Six plus 2    
      
 
 
 
Question 7 
How many members present on your audit committee  
are independent non executive directors? 
 Less than two 2    
 Three-four 18    
 Five-six 0    
 Six plus 0    
      
Question 8 Does your firm have a remuneration committee?     
 Yes 20    
 No 0    
      
Question 9 
How many persons are present on your remuneration 
committee?    
 Less than two 0    
 Three-four 16    
 Five-six 3    
 Six plus 1    
      
Question 
10 
How many members present on your remuneration  
are independent non executive directors? 
 Less than two 3    
 Three-four 14    
 Five-six 3    
 Six plus 0    
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Question 
11 Does your firm have a nomination committee?     
 Yes 18    
 No 2    
      
Question 
12 
How many persons are present on your nomination 
committee?    
 Less than two 0    
 Three-four 18    
 Five-six 0    
 Six plus 0    
      
Question 
13 
How many members present on your nomination committee  
are independent non executive directors? 
 Less than two 5    
 Three-four 15    
 Five-six 0    
 Six plus 0    
      
Question 
14 
in your opinion how many external boards may a non-executive  
director sit on and still be regarded as being an effective NED? 
 Less than two 0    
 Three-four 7    
 Five-six 10    
 Six plus 3    
      
Question 
15 
In your opinion how many years may a non-executive director 
 serve as such and still be regarded as independent? 
 Less than two 0    
 Three-four 3    
 Five-six 0    
 Six plus 17    
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Appendix VI. 
Cover letter for questionnaire. 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs/Miss.  
  
I am conducting a questionnaire to determine the level of compliance within 
Irish listed companies with the independence requirements of the combined 
code 2008 (sections A.3.2, A.3.3, A.4.1, B.2.1, C.3.1).  This is part of the 
requirements for my Masters of Arts in Accounting degree 
  
The questionnaire should take you less than five minutes to complete. Your 
participation is voluntary but I hope you will take the time to complete this 
questionnaire. Your consent to participate in this project is assumed once you 
have completed the questionnaire. Your responses will not be identified with 
you personally. 
  
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire, 
you may contact me at L00046245@lyit.ie  or my research supervisor Mr Paul 
McDevitt at Paul.McDevitt@lyit.ie . 
  
If you choose to complete the questionnaire please use the links below to do 
so. 
  
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X23M7X9 
 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X2SPCKF 
  
 Yours Sincerely. 
Aaron Dunworth 
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